Fellow-Countrymen:
Today we celebrate with great enthusiasm the 42nd National Day of the Republic of China, the Double Tenth, because it opens up a glorious chapter in the history of the Chinese Republic and imposes on us the heavy responsibility of carrying through our revolution, national salvation, and national regeneration. In reviewing the general trend of world affairs today and evaluating the results of our efforts in the past four years, we are firmly convinced that the forces of our national regeneration are gathering momentum and that the strength of our national revolution and national salvation is increasing with each passing day. In view of this fact, all our compatriots both at home and abroad should pull together and help strengthen our combat capabilities to prepare for the counterattack against the mainland and hasten the day of our national regeneration.
Fellow-Countrymen, we should know that the aggressive Communist bloc led by Soviet Russia is not enjoying the same good fortune as it has enjoyed in the last eight years since the conclusion of World War II. It can no longer annex foreign territories as it was wont to. Nor can it wage both hot and cold wars at its own sweet will. We should particularly note that three years of the Korean war fought by the Chinese Communists on behalf of their Soviet masters has shed the blood, robbed the food and broken up the family of everyone of our compatriots on the mainland. What has been gained for all these sacrifices? Only an armistice agreement negotiated on the plea of "peace." But an armistice agreement is not, a peace treaty. In the forthcoming Korean Political Conference, the culprit responsible for the Korean war will be brought to book and that menace to world peace and human freedom will be removed. There will be only two alternatives left to the choice of the Chinese Communists: they may either bow before the force of justice under the impact of the United Nations condemnation of their aggression and agree to lay down their arms and remove the cause of a third world war; or tear the armistice agreement to pieces and resume the Korean war in utter disregard of world opinion and head for self-destruction.
Not long after the rise of Malenkov following the death of Stalin in the spring of this year, Beria, the No. 2 man in the Communist hierarchy, was purged. After that, a series of all-out struggles and liquidations has been going on within Soviet Russia. In addition, rebellions against the "Soviet rulers" by the working masses in the Russian satellite countries such as East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania have broken out in rapid succession. The spirit is especially strong in East Germany where people, old and young, rush through barricade after barricade to West Germany at the risk of their lives in an attempt to get the "Eisenhower food packages." All these facts prove that the loyalty to Soviet Russia of the people both within her own borders and in her satellites has been so shaken that even terrorism and the Iron Curtain have become ineffective.
Let us take a look at the situation confronting the Chinese Communists. The courageous action of the more than 14,000 non-repatriated Chinese compatriots in seeking freedom and vowing to fight Communism with undaunted determination after they were forced to join the war in Korea has convinced us of the fact that the 5,000-year old Chinese national spirit and tradition as well as Dr. Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I have struck root in the hearts of the Chinese people and can never be suppressed by evil forces and traitors. The courageous action of those heroes is a further guarantee that aggression must end in failure and traitors must be doomed. It presages the speedy collapse of the puppet regime built on brute force once we issue the call of counterattack against the mainland. Numerous are the internal weaknesses of the puppet regime such as physical and spiritual exhaustion, impoverishment, mounting discontent and the rising tied of opposition to Communism.
The above facts show that the Russian imperialists and their puppets--Chu Teh and Mao Tze-tung--are finding themselves in an uncomfortable situation, both internally and externally, and are heading for disaster. However, we must realize that the biggest satellite of the Red imperialistic bloc is the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland. If the Chu-Mao traitorous group continues to exist, the Russian Communist bloc will continue to threaten the peace and security of the world, and that threat is bound to become more dangerous as the days go by Far-sighted individuals have come to see that if the Chinese Communists are not exterminated, Asia cannot possibly escape Red domination and neither can the whole world free itself from the Red menace. The Chinese Communists are the puppets and accomplices of Russian Imperialism. They are the common enemy of humanity. Human beings cannot hope to live, if the Communists are not crushed. At a time when the enemy is beginning to show signs of weakness, our compatriots both at home and abroad, taking cognizance of these facts, should rise up to join the common struggle against Communism.
Today I wish to address a word particularly to the civilians and soldiers on this anti-Communist bastion of Taiwan. During the past three years we have first of all completed the implementation of local self-government based on the Principle of People's Rights, which was carried out over a year ago. Hsien and municipal councilors and magistrates and mayors in all hsiens and municipalities are elected by popular vote. This year we are in the process of carrying out the "land-to-the-tiller" policy. We have made these remarkable achievements because the people, acting in perfect unison and glowing with patriotism, have given whole hearted support to the Government and have fully carried out all Governmental orders. From now on we must further strengthen ourselves militarily in preparation for the forthcoming counterattack against the mainland to deal the Communist traitors a fatal blow. We must also carry out to the utmost of our ability the Four-Year Economic Reconstruction Program to put ourselves on a sound economic basis so that the Principle of People's Livelihood Day be completely realized on schedule in Taiwan. Moreover, we must expedite our plans for the calling of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Conference so as to achieve unity of purpose and strength among our compatriots at home and abroad.
My compatriots! Now is the time for us to carryon the torch of our glorious National Revolution by regenerating the Republic of China! Let us live up to the ideals of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and of the revolutionary martyrs! Let us fight and sacrifice for the salvation of the millions of our suffering brothers and sisters on the mainland Let us by resolute action show our deep concern in the welfare of the more than 14,000 anti-Communist compatriots in Korea! Let us live up to the expectations of our compatriots on the mainland!
Let us raise our voices and shout in unison:
Long Live the Republic of China!
Long Live the San Min Chu I!
President Chiang's Message to the People of Taiwan on the 8th Anniversary of Its Retrocession to China
My fellow countrymen in Taiwan:
It has been eight years since the return of Taiwan to its fatherland. Although Taiwan has been restored to China and the people of this province have gained freedom, the whole nation has been groaning during the past eight years under an oppression unprecedented in our history. While the people on the Chinese mainland are shut behind the Iron Curtain of darkness and slavery, fortunately Taiwan has become an anti-Communist bastion, a model province for the implementation of the San Min Chu I, and the key to peace and security in the Pacific, thanks to the patriotic and concerted efforts of the people. Both the civilians and armed forces in Taiwan have not only shown their patriotic spirit in their struggle against Communism and Russian Imperialism; they have also honorably shared the responsibility of the free world in the global fight against, Red aggression. In celebrating the recovery of Taiwan today, we should, therefore, mutually encourage ourselves to rise up and accomplish the great historic mission entrusted to us.
My fellow countrymen! The fact that Taiwan is playing such an important role today is not accidental. Situated between the Chinese mainland and the Pacific Ocean and being the central link in the democratic chain in this part of the world, Taiwan has stopped the tide of Russian aggression and sounded the death knell for the traitorous gang led by Mao Tze-tung and Chu Teh. In fact, Taiwan will determine the current of events in the Orient. It is the key to the success or failure of the free world in its struggle against Communist aggression.
During the past eight years, I have more than once warned the free nations that without an independent and free China, Asia and the world as a whole would not be able to live in security and peace. The fact facing us today definitely proves that so long as the Chinese mainland is in the hands of the Russian-controlled Communists, there would be neither security nor peace for Asia and the world. The province of Taiwan, our anti-Communist and anti-Russian fortress, is the only place which is in a position to relieve the world of the threat of Russian aggression, to deliver mankind from disaster, and to insure the stability of Asia as a whole. Only when we have launched a successful counterattack against the mainland, exterminated the Communists, driven away the Russian bandits and recovered all the territories of the Republic of China in the third stage of our national revolution, can we achieve the objective of re-establishing the stability of Asia and the peace of the world.
Fellow countrymen, the importance of Taiwan and the mission of our revolution are such that we can readily see how heavy is the responsibility of our armed forces and people of the province. It is my hope that all of you will continue to exert your utmost to carry out our general mobilization campaign with increased vigor, observe Spartan economy, increase production, further animate our patriotic spirit and complete our preparations for counterattack at an early date. Only thus can the foundation for the triumph of our anti-Communist and anti-Russian campaign and for the success of our national recovery and national reconstruction be assured.
Fellow countrymen, we should all know that the role which the province of Taiwan plays in the recovery of our national territories is just like what Canton and Chungking have once played in the first and second stages of the history of our national revolution. It has in fact become the command post in the third stage of our revolution, and commands the attention of the whole world. It is also Taiwan upon which depend not only the lives of our four hundred million compatriots but also the continued development of our 5,000-year history and culture. On the occasion of this anniversary, I wish to celebrate it with all of you on this island with all my heart.
In celebrating the recovery of Taiwan, we should first of all think of the tragedy and the sufferings of our enslaved compatriots on the Chinese mainland. We must liberate the mainland and come to the rescue of our compatriots there in the same spirit as they had, eight years ago, sacrificed their lives and property to liberate Taiwan and rescue the people of this island. Only thus shall we not fall short of the expectations which all our compatriots on the mainland cherish for our armed forces and people here. The final victory of our anti-Communist and anti-Russian war will depend upon the pain staking efforts of all our armed forces and people in order to fulfill the greatest and most glorious mission in our 5,000-year history.
Finally, let us raise up our hands and shout:
Long live the Republic of China!
Long live the San Min Chu I!
Long live the National Revolution!
Victory to the anti-Communist and anti Russian War!
Statement Delivered by Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang in the General Debate of the Eighth Session of the U. N. General Assembly on 20, September 1953
In ordinary housekeeping, good housewives of all lands agree that they should not be penny-wise and pound-foolish. In the kind of housekeeping in which the United Nations is engaged, I suggest that we should try to a void being moment wise and years-foolish.
The main task of our housekeeping here is, of course, the preservation of peace. This is what this organization was established for. This is what all peoples of the world ardently desire. I suggest that we, who are entrusted by our governments and peoples with the task of peace preservation, should always keep in mind that it would be utterly foolish to win the peace of weeks and months and lose the peace of years and decades. The world has rightly condemned Munich because the peace of Munich lasted only a few months and paved the way for the Second World War.
Mme. President, I am a Chinese and therefore I do not speak here about eternal peace or perpetual peace. We Chinese find metaphysical speculation to be uncongenial. On the other hand, being a Chinese I am philosophical enough to try to look beyond weeks and months and to strive for something that may endure for years and decades.
The subject of Munich has been made threadbare. It is, in fact, too trite even for rhetorical purposes. Nevertheless, I feel compelled at the beginning of my intervention in the General Debate to refer once more to Munich. The trouble with Munich was that the agreement signed by Chamberlain and Daladier on one side and Hitler on the other was of that kind which was moment-wise and years-foolish. As I recall, Chamberlain and Daladier were not alone in advocating the peace of Munich. When they returned from Munich to their respective capitals, they were acclaimed by vast numbers of their fellow-countrymen. They honestly and sincerely told the grateful crowds that they had secured "peace in our time" and that their peace was "a peace with honor". In the fall of 1938, if my memory serves me right, almost all of Western Europe agreed with Chamberlain and Daladier. It is not the individual action of Chamberlain and Daladier that alarms me. It is the popularity of these men in the fall of 1938 that indicates to me that people in this matter of peace have not had the experience and therefore the wisdom of the ordinary housewife.
What, after all, was the trouble with Munich? In the first peace, Chamberlain and Daladier had no proof of the peaceful purpose of Nazi Germany other than the speeches of Hitler and Goebbels. In fact, the domestic policies and the diplomatic efforts of Hitler all pointed to war. So long as the nature of Hitlerite Germany remained what it was, the propagandist assurances of Hitler and Goebbels should have been discounted. In the second place, Munich turned out to be a great tragedy because Chamberlain and Daladier, by the Agreement of Munich, strengthened Hitler for further aggression.
Today, in seeking peace through the United Nations, we must not repeat the mistakes of Munich. We have the right and the duty to demand from the Kremlin actual evidence of peace-loving intentions other than and in addition to their speeches and editorial comments. In the second place, we must be on our guard against strengthening the forces of world communism and weakening the strength of the free world. After all that has been said in the peace offensive of the Soviet Union, we have no evidence whatsoever that world communism has changed its purpose or nature. All the evidence points to the fact that world communism strives today as it has striven through the last 30 years for world domination.
The Charter furnishes us some guide in our pursuit of a peace that can last years and decades. When the Charter was framed, the events leading to the Second World War were fresh in the minds of the delegates who assembled in San Francisco. They knew that the Japanese militarists could not have launched the full-scale war against China in 1937 or their Pearl Harbor attack against the United States of America in 1941 unless and until these militarists had secured absolute control of life in Japan. In the six years before Japan's full-scale war against China, the militarists in Japan executed a series of terroristic acts to get rid of political leaders who stood for peace and moderation. They had succeeded in controlling Japanese political life and public opinion to such an extent that their regime was, by 1937, totalitarian. The suppression of freedom in Japan was a pre-condition and a prelude to aggressive war.
The delegates at the San Francisco Conference undoubtedly remembered also the development of the Hitlerite regime in Germany before the German army seized Bohemia and Moravia in the spring of 1939. Hitler did away with the Weimar Republic. He established, in place of the liberal Weimar constitution, a totalitarian regime which enabled him not only to rebuild the army to sacrifice butter for guns, but to remake the mind of the German people. I was in Germany in the winter of 1934, that is, at the very beginning of the Hitlerite regime. I noticed that the common people of Germany in the winter of 1934 were not only devoted to peace, but absolutely terrified by the mention of war. The totalitarian control which Hitler managed to achieve converted a peace-loving German people into a fanatical warlike people. In Germany as in Japan, the establishment of a totalitarian regime was a pre-condition and prelude to aggressive war.
The events leading up to aggressive war by Japan and Germany were fresh in the minds of the framers of the Charter. It is for this reason that we find throughout the Articles of the Charter two consistent and intertwining themes. One theme is, of course, peace. The other theme is human rights and fundamental freedoms.
In the Preamble of the Charter we find the second paragraph declaring that we, the peoples of the United Nations, are determined "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."
Article 1 of Chapter I of the Charter, in stating the basic purposes of the United Nations, mentions "encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
Chapter IV of the Charter is devoted to the General Assembly. Article 13 of that chapter enjoins on the General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of "assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
Chapter IX of the Charter is devoted to the subject of International Economic and Social Cooperation. I should like to quote part of Article 55. "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote….. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
Chapter XII of the Charter is devoted to the International Trusteeship System. In defining the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System, Article 76 states that one of these objectives should be "to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
The Charter makes very clear the basic importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms both for the intrinsic importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for the direct and intimate relation between respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the preservation of international peace. This emphasis on the relation between human rights and peace, as attested by these Articles which I have quoted, was· due not only to the general enlightenment of the 20th Century but also due to a clear and deep recognition of the causes which led to the Second World War.
Mme. President, if the United Nations is to promote not the peace of the moment but the peace of years and decades, it must also keep in mind the intimate connection between peace and freedom. Peace and freedom are inseparable, just as tyranny and war are inseparable. In seeking peace today, we must ever keep in mind that we cannot achieve peace through the sacrifice of freedom. There are today peoples within the Iron Curtain both in Europe and Asia who are struggling for freedom. Their struggle is part of the world struggle for an enduring peace. If we understand the task of the United Nations correctly, we must recognize that the fighters for freedom and the fighters for peace are, in, fact, two wings of the same army, and that their efforts should be coordinated. It would be utter foolishness for one wing of the army to destroy the other wing of this same army.
Having suggested a guiding principle for our pursuit of peace in the world in general, I now proceed to discuss the strategy of peace in the Far East. This Assembly may be called a Far Eastern Assembly. We all have in our minds and hearts, as we begin our Eighth Session, the great problem of Korea. At our very first plenary meeting, the Soviet delegate chose to raise the question of the representation of my country in the United Nations. And we have elected you, Mme. President, the representative of an Asian country, to preside over our deliberations. All these things serve to stress the importance of the Far East in the work of the Eighth Session.
In working for an enduring peace in Korea, we must keep in mind the basic importance of unification. I humbly submit to this Assembly that the achievement of national unity by the Korean people is the key, to an enduring peace in that region of the world. The Korean people are one people, one in race, one in language, and one in tradition. The geography of the peninsula furnishes the natural foundations for national unity. In fact, Korea is more united than some of the oldest nations represented here. Basically it is more united than even Great Britain. Now, let us stop to consider what unity or division can mean to peace or war in the Far East. A united Korea would be strong enough, if not to repel aggression, at least to deter aggression. On the other hand, a united Korea can never be strong enough to commit aggression against her neighbors, even if the Korean people should be misled to launch into aggression. It is for this reason that, during the last 50 years, my fellow-countrymen have all, without distinction of political party, favored the establishment of a united and independent Korea. We desire such a Korea as much as the Western European countries have desired an independent Belgium.
The perpetuation of the division of Korea, on the other hand, would make for instability, fear and suspicion, and dreadful and costly armament. The United Nations, therefore, must remain loyal to its declared objective, that is, the establishment of a united and independent Korea.
In the Far East, China occupies a position as central and important as the position of Germany in Europe. It is impossible to promote peace and security along the fringe of China if the communist regime should remain in control of the mainland. Some of the free nations have already devoted considerable blood and treasure to ward off communist aggression, not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Malaya. I humbly submit that these sacrifices cannot create an enduring peace so long as the mainland of China remains within the Iron Curtain.
Press reports in recent weeks and months have stressed the so-called five-year plan of economic development and economic aid from the Soviet Union to its puppet. I wish to call the attention of the Assembly to one important feature of all these economic plans. That feature is the emphasis laid upon the development of the Northwest and Southwest. The constructive work in the Northwest paves the way for further Soviet penetration and exploitation of the resources of that vast region. The constructive work in the Southwest, such as the building of railways to the border of Indo-China and towards the border of Tibet are relatively unimportant for the well-being of the Chinese people but very important in the development of imperialism towards Southeast Asia.
In international relations, the traditional and universally accepted principle in China is "live and let live". In the long history of China, there were periods when Chinese armies conquered neighboring lands, when Chinese emperors sought glory through the expansion of empire. These periods were the Han Dynasty, the first part of the Tang Dynasty and the first part of the Ming Dynasty. I would like to call the attention of the Assembly to two important features of ancient Chinese imperialism. In the first place, the conqueror-emperors of China never tried to impose Chinese ways of life on the neighboring peoples. How the subject peoples lived and worshipped their gods, that was not considered the business of the imperial power to control. The second important feature of imperialism in China is that the philosophers and poets of China never joined in approving imperialism. In all China's literature there is not a single poem or philosophic essay approving of imperialism. On the contrary, Chinese writers have stressed the misery which conquest involved and the hatred which conquest generated among China's neighbors. The final result of China's historical development was to protect, China and Chinese ways of life for the Chinese people and to let other countries alone.
Now, under the Chinese communists, the traditional principle governing China's international relations is also reversed. In this respect, the communist regime is as un-Chinese as in its domestic politics. Now the Chinese communists, instead of preserving the pacifism inherent in Chinese culture, are reviving the views and ambitions of the conqueror-emperors of old, under the guise of "liberation". Representatives from countries of Southeast Asia must know that there are in their countries right now underground Chinese communist organizations. They must know that some of their fellow-countrymen are right now being trained by the Chinese communists in the acts of political subversion and, guerrilla warfare. They know or ought to know that when the Chinese communists speak of friendship between China and India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, the Chinese communists make a significant distinction--they befriend not the governments of these countries, but the peoples, and they stress the suffering and exploitation under which the neighboring peoples of China live. The revival of imperialism by the Chinese communists is one of the most basic facts in Asia.
How does Mao Tse-tung himself fed about this matter? In the winter of 1945, shortly after the surrender of Japan, Mao published a poem. He is very proud of that poem. He presents autographed copies to his followers and friends. Let me read to you what Mao has to say on this matter.
"There spreads the land in winter's northern light,
For thousands of ice-bound miles the whirling dance
Of snowy mist holds it as in a trance. Behold, beyond the Great Wall a blanket of white,
And up and down the Yellow River the flight
Of raging torrents, the choppy rugged plains,
And the snow-clad mountains' silvery manes-
How they heave and arch to reach the heaven's height!
"These lands, these rivers, their bewitching charm
Inspired the conqueror-emperors of Ch'in and Han.
Tang and Sung, in splendor striving to expand.
Alas! All short of stature! And Genghis Khan
Knew only how to shoot a hawk for play.
For the towering figure watch the scene today!"
Mao thinks that he in the middle of the 20th century can outshine the conqueror-emperors of the remote past. As a part of the communist repudiation of the Chinese traditional culture, Mao discards the Confucianist condemnation of war and imperialism.
Some people say that, since the Soviet Union and the satellite states are already in the United Nations, the addition of communist China would not make much difference. Mme. President, I contend that, if the peoples of the world in 1944 and 1945 had had the knowledge of the Soviet Union which they have today, the United Nations would have been differently organized, most likely without the participation of the Soviet Union. The question which the General Assembly should consider is not the admission of Red China but the expulsion of the Soviet Union.
Some people argue that admission of the Chinese communists into the United Nations does not imply approval. They say it is nothing more than recognition of a fact, just as the Himalaya Mountains or summer heat and winter cold are facts. In the history of my country there have been a number of dictators who established new dynasties and appeared, for a time, to possess some measure of permanence. Many of these dynasties were short-lived, only mushrooming in seeming vigor. In fact, in Chinese history, the number of short dynasties is much larger than the number of long dynasties.
Nothing the United Nations does can be or should be divorced from morals, however we might try to rationalize our conduct. We cannot escape the consequences, be they good or bad. In the present instance, the consequence of the admission of the Chinese communists would be the consolidation of that regime and the enhancement of its prestige, not only in China but throughout Asia.
The Chinese people know the communist regime to be both a tyranny and a foreign imposition. We are determined to win back both our national independence and our basic human freedoms. We have not asked the United Nations to give us aid in this struggle which is in strict accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations not to add to the difficulties and burdens of the Chinese people. If we are ever to understand the strategy of peace in the Far East, the United Nations must recognize that the struggle of the Chinese people today is, in fact, a part of the world struggle for an enduring peace.
Statement by Dr. Shuhsi Hsu Before the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression 31 August 1953
I
The position of my Delegation on the question of defining aggression is in the records. During the sixth session of the Assembly we contributed our part in proving that definition was possible and desirable--under normal circumstances of course--and offered at the same time suggestions regarding the form of the definition as well as its contents. During the seventh session we participated in the discussion equally actively, perfecting as we went along the formula we offered in the previous session. During the first meetings of our Special Committee, while we declared that we still believed in the possibility and desirability of definition as well as in the formula we had offered, we pleaded that the Committee surrender its mandate to the General Assembly on account of changed circumstances and seek new instructions as to what it should do next.
When I made known the latest position of my Delegation, some of our friends, particularly my distinguished Syrian colleague, Mr. Tarazi, wished us to reconsider it in view of our past contributions to the cause. My Delegation has tried hard to oblige them, but finds it difficult to go along the whole way. When the Assembly began discussing aggression, the United Nations was engaged in the suppression of the crime in Korea. Today it has signed a truce with the aggressors. It is true that the negotiations for a truce did not begin just yesterday. But it should be remembered that we had no business to assume during those negotiations that the policy they represented would necessarily be finalized as it has been since. So while it was proper for us to keep on discussing defining aggression in the last couple of years, it would not be advisable for us to do the same now. Conclusion of a truce with the aggressors means condonation of aggression. Incidentally, it makes the punishment of those who are responsible for the crime practically impossible. It creates an atmosphere of uncertainty concerning the very thing we are appointed to define, and places us in a false position if we try to carry out our mandate. Of course, we can always assume that the United Nations has no intention of regarding aggression as no crime and those who are responsible for it not criminals. Of course, we can assume that the world organization's aberrations from the right path are only temporary. But, if we were to proceed with our work as if the unfortunate situation had not developed, could we actually be free from its influences?
While we think it advisable to maintain the position we have newly taken, we have no intention of walking out upon the Committee. Courtesy requires that we assume that our colleagues on the Committee will be able to consider the collective interests of the organized world at least on the same footing with those of the nations they represent, and to keep as clear as humanly possible from the shadow cast upon the field of their duty by the recent falterings of the world organization.
II
Proceeding on the basis of what I have said, I would like to take up first of all the memorandum prepared by the Secretariat, document A/AC. 66/1. The Committee, I am sure, feels much obliged for this paper. It is objective and to the point. Furthermore, although it is unpretentious, it serves our needs. One particular contribution it has made, though made incidentally, is the revelation that most of the questions which consumed the time of the two Assembly sessions and found their way into the first paragraph of the preamble of Assembly Resolution 688 (VII) under which we work, are questions which are by nature secondary in importance and possible of answering with no great difficulty once the definition itself is formulated. With this memorandum from the Secretariat we trust that a great deal of time of this Committee will be saved from dispensable discussions.
There is, however, a point raised by the memorandum which seems to call for some comments. On page 7 it is said that "until the era of the United Nations, when the concept of indirect aggression first emerged, direct aggression was generally characterized by the combination of two factors, the factor of 'material' force and the territorial factor, the first serving as the means and the other as the end." In another passage in the same page it is said of the "classical type of aggression" as "consisting basically of the use of armed force directly and openly by a State, as such, against the territorial integrity and political independence of another State." The question inevitably arises as to whether it is proper to speak only of "territorial factor" with reference to "territorial integrity and political independence," in view of the fact that the jurisdictional factor, which can stand along as "the end" of aggression, is lust as important.
It is very doubtful whether we are justified even in speaking alone of territorial and jurisdictional factors as "the end" of aggression to the exclusion of other factors, not to mention the exclusive reference to the territorial factor to the neglect of the jurisdictional. We all know that the end of aggression has never been confined to territorial integrity or political in dependence, but is often nothing short of the establishment of hegemony. One cannot fail to be convinced on this point if one examines the principal wars of aggression in the community of nations in which modern international law is developed. The Seven Years' War was clearly a war over territory. Frederick the Great claimed Silesia from Maria Theresa and fought two campaigns, the first to win the territory and the second to keep it. So was the Second World War of our time, at least in its initial stage. That war was started by the Tanaka-Tojo tribe of Japanese militarists to satisfy their territorial lust over Manchuria and jurisdictional lust over North China, and by Hitler for the annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig and part of Poland.
Outside of these two, all the rest of the principal wars of aggression of our community tell a different story. It is true that in no wars can the end of aggression be single, because not only have allies different interests to serve, but the appetite of each may grow with success. It is also true that in all wars the territorial, or purely jurisdictional, factor is usually involved in the end if not from the beginning. But no sight should be lost of the fact that to attain hegemony was often the principal motive of the principal aggressor, and the one that was maintained to the end in spite of developments which complicated the issue and served to mislead students of history and international law to think of the end of aggression solely in terms of the territorial factor.
The Thirty Years' War was started because Ferdinand II of Austria asserted his hegemony over the German princes by an attempt to en force anti-Protestant policy on his neighbors even in defiance of the Augsburg decree of 1555. At no time did he contemplate the annexation of territory, and this remained largely true even when his general, Wallenstein, thought of the war not as a religious crusade, but as a political plan to give Austria a key-position in Central Europe, thereby breaching the comparatively solid Catholic Front and lining up the powerful co-religionist France against her. It may be said that perhaps Ferdinand's end was the impairment of the political independence of the German princes. But in view of the fact that he was the Holy Roman Emperor whose power over the German states was not terminated until much later, to speak of the impairment of political independence is beside the point. It is the assertion of hegemony, not the annexation of territory, that was the end of his aggression.
The War of the Spanish Succession was started when Louis XIV backed up the claim of a grandson, Philip of Anjou, for the Spanish throne even in violation of the Treaties of Partition which William of Orange had previously induced him to sign. His aggression was clearly motivated by a combination of several non- territorial elements, such as general ambition, family pride and perhaps a prospect of cornering the Spanish trade. The end may be described as the establishment of hegemony over Europe, certainly not as annexation of Spanish territory or encroachment upon Spanish sovereignty.
The Napoleonic War was a continuation of the French Revolutionary War. In view of the fact that revolutionary France had the right to resist military intervention, Bonaparte did what was legitimate in carrying the war into the enemy countries. Yet the world regarded him as an aggressor, and aggressor he undoubtedly was because his end proved to be the establishment of hegemony over Europe, not the suppression of aggression and, still less, mere resistance against it. The fact that he set up kingdoms and installed his relatives on European thrones does not change the situation. Such acts come close to the creation of satellites in our day. Their significance does not lie so much in their effect upon territorial integrity and political independence as in the establishment of hegemony. Ignoring the latter in preference for the former is just like mistaking the trees for the forest.
The two aggressions committed by Prussia under Bismarck both involved the question of territory, but again it was hegemony that mattered, not territory. Schleswig and Holstein, which featured in the Seven Weeks' War, were undoubtedly territories, but it was their disposal that was at issue, since they had already been surrendered by Denmark to the German Confederation. At any rate, it was not the territorial integrity of Austria that was at issue, since the two duchies had not been definitely assigned to any party. Alsace and Lorraine, which featured in the Franco-Prussian War, were also territories, but although territorial integrity of France was there affected, the cession was only an incident of the war, not the cause of it. The war was started, not even over the candidature of a German prince to the Spanish throne, which William I had consented not to support, but by Bismarck and Moltke altering a press message on the question to give the impression that the ambassador of Napoleon III had been affronted by the Prussian king. "After Sadowa, Sedan" rightly became a catch-phrase in France after the emperor's defeat. Prussia was out for hegemony, over Europe, not for this particular territory or that.
As to the First World War, we all know that the cause was William II's dream of hegemony and his foolish attempt to realize it, and before such a dream paled even the conflict of the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Czarist Russia in the Balkans. But this war is too recent. Some of us actually lived through it, and no full review is necessary.
Mr. Chairman, out of the eight principal wars of aggression of the international community of modern history, six were fought because the aggressors wished to establish hegemony which might or might not involve the question of territorial integrity or political independence, against two which arose from the seizure of territory as the primary purpose. This being the case, it is patently unjustifiable to speak of the end of aggression as the "territorial factor". Unless we exercise this wrong notion, we shall never succeed in producing a decent definition of the crime. If we wish to do a good job, we must think, when we speak of the end of that crime, in terms of not one or even two, but of three factors, namely, the territorial, the jurisdictional and the "hegemonical", if not also of some other.
III
Taking up the question of definition itself, I may be permitted to say first something about the question of the form. Perhaps I can say that what was advocated by my Delegation in common with several others, including, in particular, the French, as represented by my distinguished colleague Mr. Chaumont, bas been accepted by an overwhelming majority, the only articulate dissent being heard only from the Soviet bloc. What was advocated by us was a definition that is both synthetic and analytic, with exemplary enumeration of particular acts, in contrast to what is popularly known as a definition of enumeration.
The term "popularly" is here used advisedly, because fundamentally enumerative definition is no definition or, at its best, only a crude form of definition, not scientific enough for any purpose and certainly not possible of acceptance for such a function as to serve as a guide for organs of the United Nations entrusted with the maintenance of peace and security, or for international criminal tribunals set up to administer justice to parties responsible for offences against the peace and security of mankind. We speak of enumerative definition in courtesy to those who have struggled with the attempt to define aggression since the early thirties. We may wish to continue the use of the term. But we should not by so doing mislead ourselves to think that it speaks of a scientific form for a serious purpose.
To define is to settle limits; to make clear, especially in outline; to set forth the essence; to declare the exact meaning. To enumerate can never do these things. Definition means the statement of the precise nature of a thing or the meaning of a word. An enumeration is helpless in carrying out such a mission.
Even from the standpoint of common sense, enumeration should not be taken for definition. Life is complex and criminals are usually ingenious. If we enumerate crimes instead of defining them, we shall merely invite the criminals to change their method. A practical illustration of our point can be had from the question of aggression itself. It is because of the legal condemnation of aggression in the days of the League of Nations, when aggression generally assumed a direct form, that today, in the regime of the United Nations, we come to witness a general trend among the aggressors to seek cover under the indirect form. In fact, the attempt to define aggression in two Assembly sessions and possibly in one more session or two, has actually been made necessary by the ingenuity of the aggressors in taking advantage of the complexity of international life.
But that is not all of the common-sense objection. Enumeration of instances or acts of aggression instead of statement of the precise nature of the concept has a double danger. Negatively, it will create a formalistic attitude of mind in those who have to handle aggression from either the political or legal angle, possibly with the result that they may busy themselves with how aggression is committed rather than with the commission of aggression itself. Positively, it will deprive the organs, political and judicial, that have to handle persons responsible for aggression, of a proper perspective with which they can view the crime, and of a decent basis for the appreciation of the particular cases, leaving them unaided in their delicate task.
Mr. Chairman, a definition of aggression can properly take only the synthetic-analytic form, with or without exemplary enumeration. Per haps under the present circumstances when in direct aggression has been freshly admitted to be aggression, exemplary enumeration is not only desirable but also necessary, for it will help the public, if not the official organs, to understand the nature of indirect aggression and call their attention to the comparatively important kinds of this new form of an old crime.
In this connection, a word may be said about the Soviet proposal in document A/AC.66/L.2. It is gratifying to note a change in the Soviet position regarding indirect aggression. From the proposal submitted during the sixth session of the Assembly in which even the only item of indirect aggression of the Polities formula was omitted, the Soviet Union has progressed to the present proposal in which the place of indirect aggression is fully admitted. Nevertheless, the present Soviet proposal should be rejected even merely as a basis of discussion for the simple reason that it offers an enumeration rather than a definition, if not also for the fact that the items enumerated reveal a lack of a fundamental understanding of the concept of aggression. Besides, by not roundly condemning aggression, by asking the nations to agree upon the outlawry of only certain acts of aggression, the Soviet proposal indirectly sanctions aggression. It is nothing but a draft modus vivendi to apply in a state of aggression which it is not meant to terminate. It will suit a gangsterdom rather than a world organized under the United Nations.
IV
Coming to the contents of the definition, we may first take stock of the points of agreement generally reached as a result of the discussion in the two sessions of the Assembly. They are: first, aggression is the illegitimate employment of force; second, such employment can be either direct or indirect. In other words, the employment may be open or under cover, and the force employed, armed or unarmed.
With two points out of our way, only four, it seems, are left for discussion, The first concerns certain kinds of acts, popularly known as aggression; the second, the nature of aggression; the third, its ends; and the fourth, the question of legitimate employment of force, direct and indirect.
We have heard a great deal of economic and ideological aggressions. In our opinion these mayor may not, according to circumstances, be aggression in the sense that we understand it, but they should not go into any definition of aggression as independent varieties. The question to be asked first is whether aggression is the illegitimate employment of force, direct or indirect. If the answer is in the affirmative, as it has been, then the next step is to find out whether a particular act described as economic or ideological aggression is such an illegitimate employment of force, direct or indirect. To introduce concepts other than force, such as economic measures and ideology or what not, is unnecessary arid mischievous.
My Delegation, I may add, is in full sympathy with countries suffering in the hands of States not too considerate towards others in their economic practices and propaganda policy. But complaints of this kind are susceptible of pacific settlement. Even from the standpoint of policy alone it is inadvisable to set no limit to the concept of aggression.
So much for the first point concerning substance that demands discussion. The second point deals with the nature of aggression. In our opinion, aggression is a crime against the peace and security of mankind. If one examines the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, prepared by the International Law Commission, one will notice that the Commission unc0nsciously kept in mind first, direct aggression, next, indirect aggression, still next, war crimes and finally, persecution against minorities. One might wish that it had gone further, listed persecution against unarmed majority "and helped the community of nations to escape from the charge that it "strains at a gnat, and swallows a camel." At any rate, if one examines the Draft Code, one will realize that aggression is only one of the crimes against the peace and security of mankind.
Aside from the experience of the International Law Commission, it is scarcely possible for one not to think of aggression in terms of a crime against the peace and security of mankind. In discussing this question the first point to be raised is, of course, whether aggression is a crime. But once it is decided in the affirmative, as it has been, none can deny that aggression is a crime against the peace and security of mankind, even as a crime in the English common law of crimes is a crime against "the king's peace."
It is sometimes suggested that "aggression only occurs if the integrity or independence of a State is impaired or immediately threatened", or, in other words, aggression is a crime against the integrity or independence of a State. Such a view is too narrow and inadequate as the Committee may judge from the discussion we have had in connection with the question of the end of aggression. But even if we should throw the hegemonical factor into the scale in its favor, we would still find the view wanting. To define aggression as a crime against territorial integrity and political independence and for hegemony emphasizes too much its relation to the aggressed party and would come into conflict with the position of the community of nations as it exists today, and is therefore unrealistic and retrogressive. In the past, when the illegitimate employment of force was subject only to moral condemnation, there might have been some justification to consider aggression as an offence only from the angle of the victim. Today, when aggression is condemned as a public offence, the only proper way to define it is to recognize it as such, and short of so doing the Committee will fail the organized world.
The discussion on the nature of aggression leads us to the question of aggression's ends, which forms the third point of substance that demands discussion. (*) It has been claimed that the hegemonical factor is but one phase of the jurisdictional and therefore should not be considered independently. We submit that the truth is just the opposite. The aim of hegemony is political influence, not jurisdictional control. It may be attained by the establishment of branch dynasties as res9rted to by Louis XIV or Napoleon; or of spheres of political or economic activities as resorted to by Bismarck, William II and, we may add, the Tanaka-Tojo tribe of militarists; or of combinations of the two types as resorted to by aggressors of our day. Such combinations, as is well known to us, consist of a branch dynasty of an ideological, rather than a blood, relationship and a sphere of activities of a total, rather than a particular, nature, the first of which had its prototype in the mind of Ferdinand II of Austria, while the second finds no parallel in the history of the community of nations unless we go out of the field of "political influence" to that of "jurisdictional control" and take it from the empire of the Czars.
In the good old days of the aggressors when aggression was condemned only morally, an attempt to achieve hegemony might or might not result in open armed conflict. If it did not, it was usually overlooked and forgotten by the world. If it did, the political independence and even territorial integrity of some State would be involved. Thus, it is easy for a student of history who does not stop to reflect, to see the jurisdictional, or even the territorial, factor, which is apparent, in place of the hegemonical, which is hidden. Today when aggression is condemned not only morally, but also legally, an attempt to achieve hegemony still mayor may not result in open armed conflict. If it does, again the political independence and even territorial integrity of some State will be involved to the confusion of the thinking of students. If it does not, it may again be overlooked by the world, but, on account of the legal phase of the situation, it cannot be so easily forgotten. Therefore it is necessary to take account of it in any attempt to define aggression. And the task should not be too difficult. Since aggression is condemned legally, an aggressor who has the attainment of hegemony in mind will not readily resort to open armed force except when he misjudges the situation as in the case of Korea in 1950, and if he does as in that case, we can rest assured that he will get caught also as in that case. It is when he keeps within the bounds of undercover or unarmed force that we have to look out in our task of definition. In this, perhaps we shall not be off the track if we concentrate our thought on the question of the subversion of the political and social order of a State, the method par excellence in our age for the achievement of hegemony.
Many people are reluctant to admit the hegemonical factor in discussing the ends of aggression, not only because that factor is often hidden behind the jurisdictional or the territorial, but also because they are not sure whether achievement of hegemony should together be condemned. They may wish to give up their misgivings in the latter case as in the former. The hegemonical factor, like the territorial and the jurisdictional, is not necessarily bad by itself. A State can legitimately acquire territory from another State or take jurisdictional control of some kind over it provided the other State is genuinely willing. Likewise it is legitimate for a State to achieve hegemony by using its power or influence in the interests of other nations. It is when it resorts to unfair methods, such as the subversion of political and social order, that an aggression is committed.
The implications of the term subversion sometimes also cause doubt concerning reference to it as an end of aggression. Such doubt should, however, not be difficult to dispel. Subversion may be promoted by many means, but as, it is practised today it has close connection with the propagation of ideology. Now, there is nothing wrong about such a practice in itself. It becomes wrong only when it is used as an instrument against another State. And whether it is so used should not be difficult to determine. When the people of State A seize control of the country and change its political and social order simply because they are convinced of the truth of the ideology propagated by State B, the latter State cannot fairly be charged with subversion. But if State B plants agents to organize or assist in the seizure and the change, or in addition to planting agents, despatches a large army to the frontier to cow the people of State A, or even equips the subversives in State A with arms or a base of operations, the fact that State B is engaged in the subversion of the political and social order of State A will be so clear that he who has eyes cannot but see.
So far we have spoken of the ends of aggression as attack upon the territorial integrity and political independence of a State and subversion of its political and social order. There is yet another end which we may wish to note. I refer to the employment of force for the settlement of dispute's in place of pacific methods. This end, however, needs no elaboration. It is more than clear from what has transpired in Korea. The Korean Communists' armed attack upon the Republic of Korea is evidently a case in, which pacific settlement should have taken place. So is the intervention of the Chinese Communists. So also is the arming of both of them by the Soviet Union.
The fourth, and last point of substance that demands discussion concerns the question of the legitimate employment of force, direct or indirect. The Committee is aware that employment of force in self-defence and in carrying out decisions or recommendations of a competent organ of the United Nations is legitimate. What actually requires discussion therefore is whether there are other forms of legitimate employment of force.
One point we must bear in mind in this discussion is that, if not for the existence of the United Nations, the field of legitimate employment of force would be far from being restrictive. Under those circumstances nations would be free to act as before the days of the League of Nations. If there were difference, it would be that while in the "good old days" to exceed the bounds would have roused only moral condemnation, today the same would bring condemnation that is legal in nature. But such a difference in the absence of an enforcement agency would have only a theoretical value.
If this first point is admitted, a corollary will present itself. If instead of disappearing, the United Nations should cease to function effectively, it would be: unreasonable to expect the nations to do no more than wait for its bidding. If the Security Council should take no measures necessary to maintain peace and security, nations taking up arms against armed attack in self-defence could not reasonably be asked not to continue military actions until the aggressor is subdued or has admitted defeat and promised amends. If the United Nations should neglect to prevent or remove threats to e peace or to suppress acts of aggression, the nations affected by such danger or acts could not reasonably be asked not to take the law into their own hands.
What has been said concerns mainly direct aggression. What should we say concerning the indirect variety? If we remain reasonable, we cannot but admit that no nation need fold her hands in the face of indirect attack, should the United Nations do nothing to stop it. On the contrary, we would think that it would be justifiable for her to adopt measures to stop it herself. Perhaps what we might like to see is that she would not exceed legitimate limits, but would confine herself to comparable methods and suspend her activities the moment the United Nations ends its neglect and adopts effective collective measures as it should have done normally. For the lack of a name for the right of the aggressed in such a case, I should like to suggest the term "reprisals".
Mr. Chairman, in our opinion the four outstanding problems concerning substance in defining aggression can be solved, if we understand the principles involved. If we are prepared to recognize that economic and ideological aggressions are aggression only when they meet the test of the concept of the illegitimate employment of force, that aggression is a public offence, that the end of aggression is not confined to attacks upon territorial integrity and political independence, and that the victims of indirect aggression possess the right to reprisals as those who suffer from the direct form can have recourse to self-defence—if we are prepared to make these recognitions, it will not be difficult for us to formulate a definition.
My Delegation welcomes the Netherlands proposal in document A/AC.66/L.3 submitted by our distinguished Colleague Professor Roling. It is based upon the list of questions given in the first paragraph of the preamble in Assembly Resolution 688 (VII) like the Secretariat memorandum. It will undoubtedly facilitate discussion.
As a contribution on our part, though only for the reference of the Committee rather than as a formal proposal, I would like to summarize tentatively our thought on the question in a formula as well as embody the same in a draft Assembly resolution as follows:
A. Formula
Aggression is a crime against the peace and security of mankind. It consists of the employment of force, open or under cover, armed or unarmed, by a State for the violation, impairment or destruction of the territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or for the subversion of its political and social order, or, in a case of dispute with another State, for the coercion of that State in place of pacific settlement. Among other acts, it includes:
(a) Waging war, declared or undeclared, general or limited;
(b) Arming organized bands or third States for offence against a State marked out as Victim;
(c) Planting fifth columnists or subversive agents in a victim State;
(d) Inciting civil strife in a victim State by propaganda;
(e) Imposing blockades, naval or economic.
Employment of force in self-defence or in reprisal subject to the conditions laid down in international law for the exercise of these rights, and in carrying out a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations is legitimate.
B. Draft Resolution
The General Assembly.
Recalling its resolutions 599 (VI) and 688 (VII),
Mindful of the responsibilities of the Security Council concerning aggression under Article 1, paragraph 1, and Chapter VII of the Charter, and of the function of the General Assembly envisaged in Assembly resolution 377 A (V),
Considering that, although the question whether aggression has occurred must be determined in the circumstances of each particular case, it would nevertheless be advisable to formulate certain principles as guidance,
Recommends that the Security Council in the discharge of its responsibilities under Article 1, paragraph 1, and Chapter VII of the Charter, and the Members of the United Nations, when the Assembly is called upon to consider an item pursuant to resolution 377 A (V), take account inter alia of the following principles:
(1) That aggression is a crime against the peace and security of mankind;
(2) That it consists of the unlawful use or force by a State against another State;
(3) That the unlawful use of force may be open or under cover, and the force unlawfully used may be armed or unarmed;
(4) That the purpose of the unlawful use of force may be the violation, impairment or destruction of territorial integrity or political independence, or the subversion of political and social order, or, in a case of dispute, the coercion of an opponent in place of pacific settlement;
(5) That the use of force is lawful when it is resorted to in accordance with a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations, or in self-defence against an armed attack pending the taking of measures by the competent organs of the United Nations necessary for the maintenance of peace;
(6) That the employment of comparable methods in reprisal against an attack of unarmed force, open or under cover, is likewise lawful when the competent organs of the United Nations neglect to take effective collective measures for the prevention or removal of the attack, or for its suppression, as the nature of the case may demand.
Statement Made by Mr. Liu Yu-wan to the Committee on Informat